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Chapter One 
Figuring Out/In Rhetoric 
From Antistrophe to Alloiostrophe 
Jane S. Sutton and Mari Lee Mifsud 
We begin with critical reflections on rhetoric as the antistrophe of dialectic.' 
Here is the first line of Aristotle's Rhetoric: "Rhetoric is the counterpart 
[antistrophos] to dialectic."2 What this means exactly has been a point of 
some controversy over centuries of study in the rhetorical tradition. As John 
Rainolds said, "There are as many interpretations of this little word . . . as 
there are interpreters."3 However, we see something other, namely that these 
"many interpretations" of rhetoric as antistrophe are actually "one." The 
result is an amplification of the face of rhetoric to look, act, perform, and 
affect change like dialectic. Antistrophe is the trope that dominates and am-
plifies the rhetorical tradition as civic discourse. Set in this conceptual con-
textualization, rhetoric's dialectical face is a "catastrophe" for rhetoric, for 
difference, and for democratic deliberation. Why and how this is so involves 
an inward-looking investigation into how antistrophe encapsulates rhetoric 
in terms of argument and style. In this chapter, we also offer a way out of this 
traditional sensibility by troping rhetoric otherwise. Traditionally, tropes and 
figures are cast as tools to be used by agents. But Hayden White has detailed 
how tropes operate on and within discourse and, structurally speaking, deter-
mine the modes-e.g., argument, style-of discourse. In our analysis, the 
trope of antistrophe, because it defines what rhetoric is, testifies to the funda-
mental structure of rhetoric. There are other tropes. Tropes are rhetoric's 
opportunity for enlarging rhetoric's structural relation with contingency 
through difference. Our reliance on tropes is committed to using rhetoric's 
resources so as not "to betray our opportunity," something Giles Wilkeson 
Gray warned rhetoricians about as early as 1923. 4 
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We begin, therefore, with antistrophe. Next, we explore /catastrophe. Fi-
nally, we describe the trope alloiostrophe by attending to the need for a new 
trope as well as outlining a strategy for theorizing it. Grammatically speak-
ing, rhetoric is the subject and antistrophos is the predicate nominative in the 
sentence: "Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic." What does it mean to posit, 
at the structural level, a transformational equivalence between rhetoric and 
antistrophi?? What kind of relationship does the Subject-Predicate Nomina-
tive (SPN) signify? 5 One way the "grammar question" is answered is to posit 
an identical exchange: the particular subject ("[the] rhetoric") and the predi-
cate nominative (antistrophos) is a convertible proposition. In his commen-
tary on The Rhetoric of Aristotle, E. M. Cope suggests as much. "When 
applied in its strict and proper sense, it [ antistrophos] denotes an exact corre-
spondence in detail, as a facsimile or counterpart. "6 By "strict and proper 
sense," Cope is referring to the grammatical structure of SPN-subject plus a 
predicate nominative-as a "logic." 7 So structured through antistrophos, 
rhetoric and dialectic then become "convertible," which is to say rhetoric and 
dialectic are "identical in meaning" and "precisely similar in all respects." 8 
That rhetoric and dialectic are "identical" is intended to reveal that, in spite 
of specific differences, both are "opposites in the same row. "9 That is, rheto-
ric and dialectic live together under "one genus, proof." lo Although they live 
together under "one genus, proof' and are "precisely similar," rhetoric is 
subordinate and, therefore, is reduced to living at "a lower level." 11 
In a lexical sense, antistrophos combines the preposition "anti," which 
ranges in meaning from "opposite" to "instead,'~ with the noun "strophe," 
which ranges from "trick" to "turn." Antistrophos traffics in the lexical nu-
ances of both "anti" and "strophe." Some commentators, according to Rai-
nolds12 consider "anti" as "opposite" and support this with Aristotle's ex-
pression that tyranny is the converse of monarchy 13 and Dionysius of Hali-
camassus' illustration that evil is the converse of good.14 This treatment of 
"anti" leads to an interpretation of rhetoric as the converse of dialectic. 
Others, who rely on "anti" as "instead" (e.g., Averroes, Trebizond, and 
Alexander) indicate that rhetoric can "stand in for" or "act in place of' 
dialectic. 15 If this use of "anti" is combined with the use of "strophe' as 
"trick" the result resembles a Platonic understanding of rhetoric as a counter-
feit art. 16 From this reasoning, dialectic "stands in for" rhetoric, but rhetoric 
may not "stand in for" dialectic. 
Some commentators, however, remark that Aristotle's use of antistrophos 
is likely meant to signal his rejection of the analogy of the true and false arts 
elaborated by Socrates in the Gorgias. 17 Many commentators stage "strophe' 
as "turn," as in the choral strophe, or turns, in various songs and dances in 
drama. Along these lines J. H. Freese (a translator of Aristotle's Rhetoric) 
explains antistrophos as counterpart: "Not an exact copy, but making a kind 
of pair with it, and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a 
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choral ode." 18 Freese is not alone. Translators from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century draw upon the strophe 
or movement of the choral dance, the returning of the chorus to answer a 
previous strophe, to explain the relation ofrhetoric to dialectic. 19 
Despite differences with respect to "anti" and "strophe" among interpret-
ers, one thing seems to be shared by all: Aristotle "indicates a resemblance 
and extraordinaiy affinity between the art of rhetoric and dialectic." 20 This 
shared view reduces "many interpretations" to one. In effect, these "many 
interpretations" are effusions of a single interpretive industry. This industry 
manufactures a rhetoric that is one with dialectic bound up in a system of 
creating knowledge (epistemology). The effusion of a single interpretive 
industry, Susan Sontag writes, "is like the fumes of an automobile and of 
heavy industry."21 Sontag's technologically based metaphor brings before 
the eyes how a techne of rhetoric bound to dialectic through an antistrophic 
projection "poisons our sensibilities. 22 Promoting rhetoric as dialectic 
through antistrophe has, over the centuries, poisoned our sensibilities. In 
effect, amplifying rhetoric as antistrophe is rhetoric's katastrophe. 
Herein begins our experience of the katastrophe of rhetoric. Aristotle 
establishes a relationship between antistrophe and katastrophe. Katastrophe 
is a subset of antistropJie23 and is the figure that "turns down." Our tradition 
is most familiar with catastrophe through Aristotle's lexis katestrammene (a 
participle of katastrepho, the verbal form of katastrophe). 24 Katestrammene 
is Aristotle's word for periodic style, one that brings an audience to a pleas-
ant end or rest. Civic discourse, for example, adopts a periodic style as 
opposed to the paratactic style of poetic discourse and contrasts with lexis 
eiromene or the running style. However, because of the familiarity that lexis 
katestrammene holds in our tradition, it has become difficult over the years 
of the rhetorical tradition to see how bringing an audience to a pleasant end 
or rest could be a bad thing. 25 The effusion of the interpretative industry has 
reduced the ability to see our subject-something Sontag insists we must do 
to fight through the smog of interpretation. 26 
We were directed to the trope of katastropheby Aristotle, when in Book 3 
of the Rhetoric, he writes that the style of rhetoric-as the antistrophos of 
dialectic-should be a katastrophic style. The katastrophic style means to 
turn (strophos) down (kata). For Aristotle, this turning down is equivalent to 
coming to a rest. This rest is commonly referred to as a period. Synonymical-
ly speaking, the katastrophic style is the periodic style. We take the katas-
trophic style as also implicative of a kind of argument. 27 This argument 
aspires toward a conclusion. This conclusion is pleasurable because one 
comes to a rest--or period-rather than going on and on as in the running 
style. 28 
If we take a closer look at the katastrophic style, we notice something 
else. As the katastrophic or periodic style reaches an end, it does so through 
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unreflective agreement. This unreflective agreement is produced by the ex-
plicit expression oflogical connectors. For example, one would say, "I woke 
because I was thirsty" rather than "I woke, and I was thirsty." The agreement 
secured here-"I woke because I was thirsty" -is a causal relation. The 
connector because hierarchically organizes two experiences-that of waking 
and that of being thirsty. This explicit expression because imposes a particu-
lar conclusion. So although it may seem an exaggeration to say this agree-
ment is unreflective and diminishes freedom, choice, and responsibility, we 
hold true to this claim. We see at this mundane level an eclipse of the 
imagination. Why bother to imagine other possibilities of why one woke 
after a causal explanation of thirst is expressed? The desire to engage with a 
trope like katastrophe, rather than obey it, can lead to finding other tropes 
capable of expanding freedom, choice, and responsibility, particularly to the 
extent that style and argument implicate the other. 
Our example about waking and being thirsty can be passed off as trivial. 
Our core concern is this: that unreflective agreement secured at such a mun-
dane and grammatical level is a foundation of katastrophe, of turning down 
the other. We insist, therefore, that the process of understanding tropes is 
nothing less than figuring out how human beings can use all of their senses, 
not just perception, and act and live within the space of rhetoric. Because as 
Sontag reminds us, we have to be able see more, hear more, taste more, and 
smell more if we are to get out of the industry and institutionaliz.ations of our 
interpretations. Tropes like antistrophe and katastrophe embrace rest, and 
this implicates rhetoric in a system that turns down the other. To turn down 
the other is to organize bodies in a hierarchy, in the same manner as connec-
tors in arguments hierarchically organize experience. 
Recognizing this paradox that on the one hand rhetoric is theorized as an 
art of change, whereas on the other it binds change to a principle of rest, we 
have a heightened awareness of an opportunity to be disruptive. We are 
forcing a crisis here, and we do so by way of a trope called tmesis, which is 
suggested to us by Barthes's notion of "punctum."29 Punctum is a Latin term 
from the verb pungo. This verb takes a tropical or figurative sense ranging 
from prick to sting, vex, grieve, trouble, disturb, afflict, mortify, and annoy. 
Drawing from the tropical dimensions of pungo, we regard tmesis as a way to 
vex the experience of rhetoric. Although Barthes is interested in how details 
in a photograph can vex viewers' experience of it, we are interested in how 
tmesis can serve to interrupt the incidental relations between an earth at rest 
and rhetoric's systematiz.ation. As the incidental can bother how rhetoric's 
system is envisaged, it leads to a cut, making it possible to realize that 
rhetoric is not one system. There is something more. We mark this cut as 
"kata-strophe." The hyphen signifies the cut, the disruption and the space to 
interface otherwise. This kata-strophe allows us to pursue two systems of 
change: one system of change is bound to rest and functions through substi-
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tution, the other is where change is cut from or disrupts its relation with rest 
to energize transmutational change. 
To see kata-strophe we tum now to the quadripartita ratio, the four 
traditional rhetorical systems of change governed by "kata" (Table 1.1 ).For 
present purposes, we reframe the four systems of change as two operating 
systems. Such reframing allows us to focus our attention on the interactions 
between the operation by substitution ( kata enallagen) and the operation by 
transmutation (Table 1.2). 
We see transmutation consisting of three systems of change. They are 
subtraction, addition, and transposition. The quadripartita ratio offers defini-
tional characterizations of the types of change made possible by kata-
strophe. The two kinds of change that provide for our broad characterization 
of rhetoric are derived from the tropes that govern them. The operating 
system of substitution is governed by antistrophic relations whereas that of 
transmutation is governed by al/oiostrophic relations. So the operation of 
substitution admits one type of change, which is to no small degree ruled by 
the telos, or idealized end, of rest. In contrast, the system of transmutation 
demands three types of change to produce the energy required for the equal 
action of changing (Table 1.2). 
Continuing with our reflections on rhetoric figured antistrophically as 
dialectic, we see that this change happens through the operating system of 
substitution. The basic figure of substitution is synonymia. Synonym is the 
means by which rhetoric substitutes its relation with random change for 
dialectic's relation with rule-governed change. The substitution creates rhet-
oric's similarity with dialectic. 
When synonym forges a unity between rhetoric and dialectic, difference 
enters the operating system or space of substitution, not as other, but as the 
self-same, molar, and unitary. In this way the mental habit of linearity and 
objectivity take hold and persist in their hegemonic power over rhetoric. As 
difference as difference collapses into the operating system of substitution, 
Table 1.1. Rhetorical Systems of Change 
Substitution 
Kata enallagen 
synonymia 
anaco/outha 
acyrologia 
Subtraction 
Kataaneian 
syncope 
meiosis 
anesis 
Addition 
Kata 
pleonasmon 
epitheton 
metaplasm 
polysyndeton 
Transposition 
Kata metathesin 
apostrophe 
tmesis 
al/oiosis 
Adapted from Gideon 0. Burton, "Silrn Rhctoricac, .. cf. Quintilian 5.38 
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Table 1.2. Operating Systems Distinguished by Type(s) of Change 
Operating System of 
Substitution 
Type of Change 
Substitution 
Operating System ofTransmutation 
Type of 
Change 
Subtraction 
Type of Change Type of Change 
Addition Transposition 
rhetoric creates a form appreciated for its power associated with democratic 
deliberation. Yet, by reducing the other to the self-same, the system of substi-
tution and its accompanying tropes of antistrophe and katastrophe sustains 
the habit of dealing with difference in undemocratic terms, defining other as 
difference, diversity, strangeness and creating an exclusive conceptual con-
text. This reduction of difference to the self-same is the eventual logic of the 
operating system of substitution as it orchestrates meaning, relating, and 
communicating to achieve the ideal of rest. By virtue of the defining and 
dynamic antistrophic relation between rhetoric and dialectic, the operating 
system of substitution enacts a style, the turning-down style, that, in tum, 
accounts for rhetoric's peculiar relation with the other. Style is not decorative 
but a concept that sustains flows of contact and connections. 
A closer look at Table 1.1 reveals that synonymia is not the only figure 
moving the system of change signifying substitution (kata enallagen). Other 
tropes in this system of substitution are less well known, namely anacoloutha 
and acyrologia. Who is as familiar with an anacoloutha as a synonym? Who 
could write an acyrologia with as much ease as a synonym? The comparative 
nonexistence of anacoloutha and acyrologia compared to the ubiquity of 
synonym may be on account of the potential for inconsistency and impro-
priety that alien tropes such as anacoloutha and acyrologia denote. Are these 
tropes thinkable, speakable, or writable? Ignoring these tropes only strength-
ens synonymic change in a system of substitution. Strengthening synonymic 
change works to tum down the possibility of interacting with who or what is 
not consistent or proper. For these reasons, what if inconsistency and impro-
priety were aspects of change that could inflate substitution to regenerate 
relations with others in ways not recognized by synonym, but nevertheless 
ways that support the kinds of engagement with the other that rhetoric claims 
for democratic deliberation? Such engagement with the other would have to 
account for substituting impropriety for propriety as a means of democratic 
change. And we have certainly seen impropriety as a means of democratic 
change. 
By intra-animating the figures within the system of substitution-synony-
mia with anacoloutha and acyrologia-we can recognize how profound the 
change within this system can be when impropriety and inconsistency are 
connected with likeness offered by the synonym. Yet, still this encounter 
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with otherness is insufficient because it can only amplify the kind of change 
the system of substitution allows and ultimately ignores, neglects, and ex-
cludes the other systems of change, systems that can really make a difference 
in the equalization of democratic deliberation. A system of adding exemplary 
actors into the dominant structure has already been exposed for its shortcom-
ings. 30 
Yet we need not stop at exposing this structural critique. We can see that 
we have other rhetorical resources of change that have gone untheorized. 
These resources stand by the side of the operating system of substitution 
governed by synonym. They are unused, rejected, and undertheorized. So, 
not only have we not paid attention to the figures of difference within the 
system of substitution, but also those from beyond this system, a total of 
three other systems. Whereas the bulk of rhetoric's resources lie in these 
multifaceted systems of change, and in these figures of difference and other-
ness, the rhetorical tradition has theorized only the smallest sliver of re-
sources. The operating system of substitution then polices its boundaries of 
likeness and the self-same by theorizing out these figures of difference and 
silencing them. 
We believe that the difficulty in writing an anacoloutha or an acyrologia 
is a good symptom of disturbance. Just to entertain the imagination with the 
idea of using rhetoric's tropical resource in other ways reveals limitations of 
rhetorical theory. But our inability to speak with acyrologia should not stop 
us from thinking of how to expand democratic change with the resources of 
tropes. 
Thus, we imagine something other. We see that interanimating these fig-
ures within these various systems of change moves the system of substitution 
out of itself and into another, resulting in an interanimation of the systems of 
substitution and transmutation. The logic of this interanimation does not 
resemble the logic of representation, the logic of articulation, nor of sublima-
tion. If the systems of change were set to operate within a logic of representa-
tion, one system of change would be indexed to govern the other. In light of 
the power relations and structural patterns of exclusion in which the system 
of substitution traffics, a logic of representation is insufficient for imagining 
the two systems engaged in a living and dynamic process of inter-connected-
ness. It is not enough to borrow from the logic of articulation and its process 
by which tacit knowledge and skills are made explicit. What more is needed 
is a theoretical compass whereby the system of substitution is de-patholo-
gized of the pejorative treatment of change. However, a logic of sublimation, 
because it relies on utilizing "lower" tendencies by uplifting them, ignores 
the kind of contact we envision. How do the systems function? What is the 
specific contribution of the system of transmutation? 
The system of transmutation entails transactional relations of three kinds 
of change, namely addition, subtraction, and transposition. One kind of 
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change cannot produce transmutation. Within the operating system of trans-
mutation, there must be activity among three kinds of change that affect and 
influence the other ones. Substitution can only replace another. The operating 
system of substitution replaces random change, diversity, and difference with 
rule-governed change that can only eventuate in rest. Transmutation is a 
system capable of relating with the other in a variety of ways. The self can be 
added to the other or vice versa (change through addition). The self can be 
subtracted from the other or vice versa (change through subtraction). The self 
can switch places with the other, becoming other, and vice versa (change 
through transposition). This is not the case in an operating system of substitu-
tion. Thus, we see the operating system of transmutation as a resource for 
creating change in many ways for various purposes, none of which could be 
called "rest." 
Let's take a closer look at one of these categories of change within the 
operating system we are calling transmutation: transposition. Transposition 
is a space where inconsistency, difference, and change through otherness can 
move freely. Transposition is the category of change characterized by the 
figure anastrophe. This figure marks a disordering of an accepted relation-
ship between two elements of a proposition. Anastrophe traditionally marks a 
change in position, but to call this change of position simply an inversion or a 
reversal is to miss the opportunity for change that other figures in the system 
of transposition animate, such as tmesis, which creates a cut in an accepted 
order. The interaction of these two figures-anastrophe and tmesis-within 
the system of transmutation creates change marked by both destruction 
(cutting) and creation (change in meaning). To return once more to a consid-
eration of transmutation at the most basic level of the word, "katastrophe" 
disrupted is "kata-strophe." The hyphen is a cut (tmesis) that destroys an old 
meaning (e.g., katastrophe) and creates a new meaning (e.g., kata-strophe). 
The trope of the cut is what takes us back to a heretofore unknown, a radical 
other, and the possibility of change beyond substitution. 
Tmesis offers the connection for turning to apostrophe. Under the pur-
view of apostrophe, we turn out toward something other. We find the re-
sources of apostrophe so expansive as to be able to turn out to difference in a 
radically new way. 
We look back on what we have said in relation to the two operating 
systems. We want to explain how they pertain to apostrophe and then we can 
move forward with another view of apostrophe from the vantage point of 
transmutation. Table 1.3 shows apostrophe in an operating system of substi-
tution, and table 1.4 shows apostrophe in an operating system of transmuta-
tion. We adapt from quadripartito ratio the basic tropes to which apostrophe 
is linked, and off er a vision of how these tropes are regarded in the different 
operating systems. 
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In these tables, we see the systems of change governed by the trope of 
apostrophe. In classical rhetorical theory, these systems are designed to af-
firm the self-same, tum down difference, and make change behave in accor-
dance with principles of regularity and rest. So, that which is incidental is 
extraneous, that which crosses over is shifty, things or people who are of a 
different kind present only discordance, and difference and otherness is just 
confusing. But apostrophe's resources for change are more expansive than 
this. If apostrophe were theorized in a system of transmutation, the incidental 
would be experienced as new matter, that which crosses over as motion, 
things or people who are of a different kind becomes the child-as-other, and 
otherness and difference become an experience ofreflexivity. 
The crossing over of metabasis can, again, be understood as analogy, but 
not an analogy governed by synonymia. The analogic movement of metaba-
sis within the system of transposition is governed instead by anacoloutha 
(inconsistency). Governed as such, the movement of metabasis is a transposi-
tion of subjects that hitherto seemed radically inconsistent: "O Rose, thou art 
sick!"31 Metabasis governed by anaco/outha in a system of transposition 
creates associations through difference. Difference becomes the incidental, 
"the tiny spark of accident," 32 releasing meaning from only ever being turned 
down by substitution. Within the system of transposition, parenthesis inter-
polates new matter, namely incidentals. In this way, apostrophes cross 
over-move out of-the frame of the thesis. To return to "O Rose, thou art 
sick!" this speech differs dramatically from speech that asserts "The rose is 
sick!" What is inserted apostrophically is nothing less than a feeling, specifi-
cally, deep concern arising in inconsistency-a rose and a condition of sick-
ness. This insertion of feeling expressed through inconsistency is a breaking 
out of discourse constrained by rules against the extraneous enforced by 
dialectic. The breaking out, which is an insertion, is a movement toward 
intense involvement with the situation described. The insertion of feeling, as 
well as the inconsistency, is so strong as to create radical change. The mood 
of apostrophe a la parenthesis is imperative. This insertion through inconsis-
Table 1.3. Apostrophe Linked to System of Substitution 
Parenthesis Metabasis Heteroiosis Alloiosis 
aside crossing over things or people otherness 
incidental of a different difference 
kind; difference 
extraneous shifting discordant confusing 
Adapted from "Apostrophe" in Duprie.rJHalsall: R. Dean Anderson 
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Table 1.4. Apostrophe Linked to System ofTransposition 
Parenthesis 
aside 
incidental 
new matter 
Metabasis 
crossing over 
motion 
Heteroiosis 
things or people 
of a different 
kind, difference 
child-as-other 
Adapted from "Apostrophe" in Dupriez/Halsall; R. Dean Anderson 
A//oiosis 
otherness 
difference 
reflexivity 
tency, this breaking out spoken in the imperative, extends to us the possibil-
ity of crossing over. Thus, metabasis is the organ of motion in the system of 
transposition, and it moves like the cuttlefish. As Marcel Detienne and Jean-
Paul Vernant portray this creature, the cuttlefish moves obliquely, combining 
several different directions at once. It is polymorphic and has pliable tenta-
cles. The metis of the cuttlefish is "subtle and flexible as the coming-to-be 
over which they preside relate not to that which is straight and direct but to 
that which is sinuous, undulating and twisting not to be unchanging and fixed 
but the mobile and ever-changing; not to what is pre-determined and un-
equivocal but to what is polymorphic and ambiguous."33 Moreover, the ink 
of the cuttlefish provides a way of moving, of getting out. Cuttlefish carry 
within them a dark liquid. Aristotle notes that the cuttlefish hides in its dark 
liquid. It pretends to move forward but then in that forward moment, the 
cuttlefish inserts its dark ink and turns back. 34 Thanks to the digression 
marked by the ink of the cuttlefish, apostrophe refers to the turn and threat 
that is polymorphic and ambiguous, the turn to a way through or crossing 
into different spaces. 35 
Once apostrophe turns us out toward the other, we see more tropical 
resources available for orchestrating different kinds of change. We attend 
first to the resource of a long forgotten trope, alloiostrophe. We see this trope 
as a transmutation of antistrophe. In brief, alloiostrophe is a trope that turns 
toward difference, diversity, and the other. We explore alloiostrophe first in 
relation to its two parts: alloiosis and strophe. 
We see in al/oiosis a reflexive figure, marking at once an experience of 
heteros (something other) and being radically changed by this experience, so 
that the self-experiencing other does not experience it through similitude and 
unity but through difference and separation. 
Whereas a traditional image of alloiosis (the reflexive experience of be-
ing altered by the other) appears in Greek antiquity as the wet nurse nourish-
ing and altering a child through milk, 36 a radical image of the other appears 
in postmodemity as a woman giving birth to a child: "The arrival of a child 
Figuring Out11n Rhetoric 11 
is, I believe, the first and often the only opportunity a woman has to experi-
ence the Other in its radical separation from herself, that is, as an object of 
love." 37 We find significant the differences between Hippocrates' and Julia 
Kristeva's references to otherness. Hippocrates' perspective constructs the 
woman as nourishing the child as other, hence constructing the other as 
dependent. Such dependence characterizes the other as needy and attached, 
and creates the conditions for possession. Kristeva constructs the woman as 
birthing the child as other, hence constructing the other as distinct and unat-
tached-a radical separation from the self. This point of radical separation 
constitutes a moment of reflexivity, where the subject (woman with child) 
erupts. This eruption arouses the subject into recognizing the other as distinct 
and separated, yet as an object of love. 
From this image of woman, we turn back to apostrophe. The "turning 
away" of the apostrophe is a double move. To see apostrophe from within 
the system of substitution is to see the other through possession and contrac-
tion. Without being possessed and contracted, the other, from within the 
system of substitution, can only display silly talk and false reasoning. In 
turning away, apostrophe provokes the incidental. If we are not to miss the 
opportunities of the incidental, where "the future is nesting" 38 for the other, 
then we must see apostrophe's double move, not only its move within a 
system of substitution but also within a system of transposition. Apostrophe 
in a system of transposition, working to effect transmutational change, in-
vites us to encounter the other not by way of conclusion but by way of 
introduction. The other is therefore not reduced and subdued, possessed and 
contracted, but introduced as a distinct agent of difference. 
From a rhetorical standpoint, the other is not a child. The other is a trope 
taking the name alloiostrophe. The scarceness of historical resources with 
respect to this trope are in part the legacy of working exclusively in a system 
of substitution coupled with a received tradition whose landscape is dominat-
ed by an operating system of substitution where metaphor drives the interac-
tion with the other. Alloiostrophos is not a trope that the history of rhetoric 
recognizes. Despite its presence in Liddell, Scott, and Jones as both alloios-
trophos and al/oiotropos, this figure cannot be found anywhere in the rhetori-
cal tradition, from Aristotle to Kenneth Burke, nor in any handbooks on 
rhetoric, whether in antiquity or contemporary times. 39 Yet the term resides 
in its adjectival form in the ancient Greek lexicon. We take this as an invita-
tion to theorize. The infrequent textual record of this trope is not a constraint 
for us but an opportunity to imagine alloioslrophic rhetoric, why it is neces-
sary, what characteristics it displays, and how it might be performed. 
"My love is a red rose." Poets, rhetoricians, and tragedians would identify 
this expression as a metaphor. But who could write, speak, or perform an 
alloiostrophos? As it turns out (according to Hephaestio and later commenta-
tors), Aeschylus, Aristophanes, and Sophocles wrote alloiostrophes. 40 Yet, 
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al/oiostrophos is unexplored in the realm of rhetoric. Worse yet, it is structu-
rally eclipsed by the privileged status of metaphor. 
From Aristotle's privileging of metaphor as the means to bring ideas 
before the eyes4I to Kenneth Burke's privileging of metaphor as the means of 
identification, 42 metaphor has held a primary position in rhetorical theory. 
This primacy of metaphor does not seem capricious. As Hayden White ex-
plains, metaphor is necessary to the process of understanding. Understanding 
in general is a metaphoric process of rendering the unfamiliar familiar by 
asserting a similarity in a difference. 43 Moreover, White observes that meta-
phor is even the master of the four master tropes. As he puts it, once we 
recognize the metaphoric character of understanding, "we may then distin-
guish metonymy and synecdoche, as secondary forms ofmetaphor."44 
The primacy of metaphor does not go unnoticed. Paul Ricoeur goes so far 
as to say that in the rhetorical tradition, tropological resources have been 
"progressively closed" to all but metaphor. 45 Gerard Genette observes that at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, metaphor alone survived the "great 
shipwreck of rhetoric and this miraculous survival is obviously neither fortui-
tous nor insignificant."46 No one forecasts the primacy of metaphor more 
wryly than Wayne Booth: "I have in fact extrapolated with my pocket calcu-
lator to the year 2039; at that point there will be more students of metaphor 
than people."47 
Ricoeur, Genette, and Booth all recognize the reduction of tropological 
resources to metaphor. Drawing from Chaim Perleman and Luce Olbrechts-
Tyteca, we offer an explanation of why this reduction is a problem. As 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call attention to the argumentative role of 
tropes as superior to their ornamental role, 48 we recognize that a multitude 
and diversity of tropes would increase rhetoric's argumentative resources, 
not enlarge rhetoric's resources for indulging in a "useless pastime" in the 
"search for strange names." 49 Because each trope is a context for argumenta-
tive procedure, each one inclines us to see-to theorize-and on the basis of 
that context, each trope heightens our choices. Thus heightened, each trope-
being an argumentative resource-puts human agency to the test. To increase 
the multiplicity of tropes is to strengthen the practice of argumentation pre-
cisely at the point of interaction between people and their use of language 
where choices and responsibility are articulated. Or to put the matter nega-
tively, to reduce the multiplicity of the tropes to, for example, metaphor, 
diminishes our agency and choices as well as our responsibility and freedom. 
Moreover, the primacy of metaphor in rhetoric limits the space for differ-
ence. Metaphor is a master trope of substitution. It permits difference to be 
substituted for all that is already familiar, thereby making it difficult to make 
contact with difference as difference. In metaphoric systems, difference en-
ters the realm of understanding in the form of the self-same. Such under-
standing is compounded by metaphor's ubiquity, which irresistibly draws 
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difference into the form of the self-same. This ubiquity further eclipses the 
ability to make contact with difference as d~fference. By recognizing such 
problems with the primacy of metaphor, we find a need to first bracket what 
Ricoeur calls metaphor's "dictatorial position,"50 and then expand awareness 
of the tropological resources for attending to difference. We need alloiostro-
phos to turn us toward difference and make an outside incursion into the 
regions eclipsed by metaphor. As outsiders, we can no longer, as Helene 
Cixous writes, continue to build rhetoric as the empire of the self-same. 51 
The future of rhetoric, speaking al/oiostrophically, requires that rhetoric 
open itself up to a reconsideration of the tropes and the promise they hold for 
inventiveness, otherness, and difference. 
With etymological play, we approach the question: What characteristics 
does alloiostrophos display? We see this word in two parts: strophos and 
strangeness. The "turn" of the strophos is defined by the "difference," "diver-
sity," "alteration," and "strangeness" of the "other," the "al/oios." 52 This turn 
is less about a gesture of cultural sensitivity and more about the alteration of 
that gesture. Insofar as the gesture of cultural sensitivity is prefigured by 
metaphor, it enacts a self-same turn, rendering the unfamiliar other familiar. 
Although this self-same tum is described as successful, with success meas-
ured in terms of charity or inclusion toward the other, it configures an argu-
mentative context restricted by its procedure of rendering the unfamiliar 
familiar. A strophic gesture defined by "alloios" fundamentally alters the 
constitution of the self-same-other relation. 
In order to illuminate this alteration, we return to play with etymology, 
this time focusing on "alloios." Unlike alloiostrophos, which does not exist 
in the received rhetorical tradition as a trope, alloiosis does exist, yet not 
without marginalization. Quintilian includes alloiosis as a figure 53 but unfor-
tunately gives no examples. Renaissance rhetorical theorist Thomas Swyn-
nerton54 lists alloiosis fifth, after metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and 
irony, which of course are known today as "the master tropes." 55 But despite 
Swynnerton's scriptural references to alloiosis, the trope, as Brain Vickers 
observes, has been largely forgotten or ignored by rhetoricians since the 
Reformation. 56 
Such a marginal position as a trope of difference might call for a reclama-
tion project, to excavate the material remains of alloiosis to strengthen it. In 
this manner, we would search for examples of alloiosis. As much as we 
would like to explore this path, this manner of proceeding is problematic. We 
believe that theorizing al/oiostrophos comes before finding examples of 
al/oiosis. Without a new way of seeing (i.e., a new theory), any examples of 
al/oiosis we might find risk being understood only through the primacy of 
metaphor via an antistrophic rhetoric. 
Our focus, therefore, is not on reclaiming alloiiJsis for the rhetorical tradi-
tion but on theorizing a new turn for rhetoric, a new strophos, an alloiostro-
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phos that would deviate from the normative strophos-antistrophos to dialec-
tic upon which rhetorical theory is built. In his opening line, Aristotle uses 
the trope antistrophos to define rhetoric through dialectic. 57 As we detailed 
in the beginning of the chapter, "antistrophic theorizing" with rhetoric is a 
katastrophe for rhetoric, for it favors the familiar and the metaphorical, and 
turns down difference. 
We return now to our reflections on rhetoric and dialectic in Aristotle's 
opening line of the Rhetoric. Not only is a metaphoric relation figured in this 
first line, it is figured in a katastrophic style. The katastrophic style here is 
evinced by the use of the copulative "is."58 Note that Aristotle follows this 
opening line by identifying only the similarities between rhetoric and dialec-
tic, saying nothing of their differences. Thus, from the start Aristotle "meta-
phorizes" rhetoric katastrophica//y through dialectic. This metaphoric ren-
dering colonizes rhetoric's difference and puts its theory in the service of the 
empire of reasoning ruled by dialectic. 
To return to Cixous' critique of classical rhetoric, this building of the 
empire of the self-same forces "the orator . . . to unwind a thin thread, dry 
and taut." 59 In our previous example of periodic style at both the grammati-
cal and rhetorical levels, we experience performances of this thin thread 
unwinding. This thread is a symbol of the line of meaning imposed by the 
katastrophic style. The thinness of the thread is an effect of the reductive 
quality oflogical connectors like "because" and the copulative "is." To speak 
katastrophically is "to stay the threaded course," so to speak, and avoid 
multiplicity and perhaps irrationality. As the orator unwinds this thin thread 
and makes it to the end, he or she, in Aristotle's terms, achieves a pleasurable 
resting place. Following Cixous, we find this resting place akin to death, 
namely the death of difference. Affirming life, not only for difference but for 
rhetoric, we turn now to explore how the trope alloiostrophos enacts its turn 
toward difference. 
We take our first clue from the ancient Greek lexicon. According to 
Liddell, Scott, and Jones, a/loiostrophos is "of the irregular strophes, i.e., not 
consisting of alternate strophe and antistrophe."60 Hence, alloiostrophos can-
not move metaphorically as antistrophe can. How then can it move? We see 
it move metonymically. Whereas Hayden White, as we have earlier refer-
enced, believes metonymy to be a mere subset of metaphor (which is similar 
to Burke's definition of four master tropes), we follow Roman Jakobson. 
Jakobson believes metonymy to be a distinct figure from metaphor. In partic-
ular, metonymy signifies relations through contiguity, whereas metaphor sig-
nifies relations based on similarity. 
We see this distinction readily through rhetorical effect, with metaphor 
producing assimilation, for example, rendering two distinct phenomena the 
same; and with metonymy producing association, for example, juxtaposing 
two phenomena rendering them distinct. In this section, we address the irreg-
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ular movement of al/oiostrophos as metonymical. We do so by juxtaposing 
the antistrophic and alloiostrophic movements. 
The antistrophic movement, to the extent that it aspires to conclusion, 
takes conclusion as its te/os, and in its movement toward this telos turns 
down other possibilities. The alloiostrophic movement is an exertion toward 
other possibilities, and takes the recognition or imagining of other possibil-
ities as its telos. The regular movement of the antistrophic system is assimi-
lative (metaphoric), where parts entering a whole lose their distinctiveness 
for the greater good of the whole. The irregular movement of the alloios-
trophic system is aggregative (metonymic), where parts entering a whole do 
not lose their distinctiveness but exist side by side within a unity. This irregu-
lar movement transfigures the space of speech so that alterity can speak 
beyond the rule of metaphor. Thus, alloiostrophic rhetoric turns to the com-
plexity of possibility; therein resides its end, its telos. This presents a para-
dox, because in an antistrophic rhetoric the end is a resting place, whereas in 
an al/oiostrophic rhetoric the end is a place of possibility. 
In this example, we can see that both anti.strophic and alloiostrophic 
rhetoric might be said to begin with a wish to make contact with the other. 
The anti.strophic rhetoric wishes for a contact that would gain the adherence 
of interlocutors and secure their assent and mental cooperation. Anti.strophic 
contact prefigures the possibility of familiarity and the self-same. By 
contrast, the alloiostrophic rhetoric wishes for a contact that would recognize 
and attend to the complexity of other possibilities as well as diversity and 
difference. So alloiostrophos is an irregular tum motivated by a wish to take 
us to other possibilities in a way that would permit contact without catas-
trophe. Alloiostrophos prefigures the possibility of alterity alongside of, rath-
er than contesting or reducing, the space of rhetoric with all its hierarchical 
privileges. 
Thus, whereas the regularity of the antistrophic rhetoric is performed 
through a metaphor of similarity, the irregularity of alloiostrophic rhetoric is 
performed through a metonymy of difference. Whereas metaphor moves to a 
collective via an assimilation of difference into the self-same, a metonymy 
generates differences as an aggregate. As an aggregate, differences do not 
lose their distinctiveness in the process of coming into a collective. 61 As 
such, differences are related in apposition within an aggregate, i.e., they are 
differentiated from the other. 62 In appositional relations, differences form an 
aggregate as a collective. 
Whereas antistrophic rhetoric is configured in the space of the ap1ra, the 
public space for speech, alloiostrophic: rhetoric is configured in the idiosyn-
cratic and particular lived reality of alterity. Our challenge to the prevailing 
system implies a positive vision. Toward that end, we need to see more of the 
contingent in rhetorical practice than what the Aristotelian tradition allows us 
to see. If we want to create a rhetoric that can sustain the ground for differ-
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ence, then we need to enlarge our sense of contingency. This enlarged idea of 
contingency, while it reclaims uncertainty, does so in order to reconfigure 
relations with the other. If we begin to think of the field or scope of rhetoric 
as grounded in contingency then we are expanding or reconciling that part of 
the field that has been partitioned off. We address difference in the next four 
chapters. 
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